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Abstract—Community detection plays an important role in
social networks, since it can help to naturally divide the network
into smaller parts so as to simplify network analysis. However, on
the other hand, it arises the concern that individual information
may be over-mined, and the concept community deception has
been proposed to protect individual privacy on social networks.
Here, we introduce and formalize the problem of community
detection attack and develop efficient strategies to attack com-
munity detection algorithms by rewiring a small number of
connections, leading to privacy protection. In particular, we first
give two heuristic attack strategies, i.e., Community Detection
Attack (CDA) and Degree Based Attack (DBA), as baselines,
utilizing the information of detected community structure and
node degree, respectively. And then we propose an attack strategy
called “Genetic Algorithm (GA) based Q-Attack”, where the
modularity Q is used to design the fitness function. We launch
community detection attack based on the above three strategies
against six community detection algorithms on several social
networks. By comparison, our Q-Attack method achieves much
better attack effects than CDA and DBA, in terms of the
larger reduction of both modularity Q and Normalized Mutual
Information (NMI). Besides, we further take transferability tests
and find that adversarial networks obtained by Q-Attack on a
specific community detection algorithm also show considerable
attack effects while generalized to other algorithms.
Index Terms—community detection, community detection at-
tack, genetic algorithm, social network, privacy protection, mod-
ularity, adversarial network.
I. INTRODUCTION
COMPLEX networks can well represent various complexsystems in our daily life, such as social networks [1],
[2], biological networks [3], power networks [4] and financial
networks [5]. Network science has been a very active field
because of its highly interdisciplinary nature [6], problems
such as link prediction [7], node classification [8], network
reconstruction [9] or community detection [10] have been
widely studied. And as one hot topic in this field, community
detection has attracted great attentions of researchers from
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various disciplines [11]–[13]. Detecting communities in the
network has played an important role in getting a deep
understanding of its organizations and functions.
However, with the rapid development of community de-
tection algorithms in recent years [14], a new challenging
problem arises: information over-mined. People realize that
some information, even their own privacy, is going to be
over-mined by those social network analysis tools. The web
we browse, the people we contact with and more things
like that are all recorded through the Internet. Our interests,
circle of friends, partners on business can be easily detected
once these data are utilized [7], [15]. Community hiding or
deception [16]–[18] is put forward to hide certain community.
Still, community detection attack is launched on the network to
change some of its structure thereby making the performance
of related algorithms worse and the accuracy of results lower.
The problem of making communities in the network more
difficult to detect through attack strategies against detection
algorithm is worthy studying because the good attack strategies
can be a guideline for individuals or organizations to disguise
their social circles and change the way they interact with
others, lest some privacies get leaked [17]. In this paper
we focus on investigating the attack strategy and testing
the effectiveness of these strategies through experiments. In
particular, we propose two heuristic attack strategies to address
the problem shown in the last paragraph. Heuristic strategy is
vital because it is easy to implement and plays well sometimes.
During the design process of heuristic attack strategies, we
take community detection algorithms and some properties of
complex networks into consideration. One question is about
what kind of nodes to be chosen as targets may benefit the at-
tack effect. Typically, node centrality is a common-used index
to measure the importance of nodes in the network. It mainly
includes degree, betweenness and closeness. Compared with
betweenness, whose calculation desires global information,
degree is a quantity only based on local information with less
computation [19]. Thus, we propose an attack strategy based
on degree and take some tests.
Furthermore, we consider the design of attack strategy as an
optimization problem. Owing to the good performance in solv-
ing complex optimization problems, evolutionary algorithms,
such as Genetic Algorithm (GA), have been widely used in
various disciplines, including complex networks [20]–[22].
Searching for attack schemes which make the performance of
community detection algorithms decrease most under given
attack cost is a typical combinatorial optimization problem.
We propose an attack strategy based on GA, namely Q-
Attack, where the modularity Q is used to design the fitness
function, and show its effectiveness on different community
detection algorithms and several real-world networks. The
major contributions of our work are summarized as:
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2• First, we introduce and formalize community detection
attack problem, which is to implement global community
deception and privacy protection;
• Second, we propose two heuristic attack strategies and
GA based Q-Attack method to launch attack with negli-
gible rewiring to cheat community detection algorithms;
• Third, we conduct comprehensive experiments to com-
pare the attack effects of different attack strategies against
six community detection algorithms on several real-world
networks;
• Finally, the transferability of Q-Attack is validated and we
think that community detection attack can also be a robust
evaluation metric for anti-attack capacity comparison of
community detection algorithms.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Sec. II reviews the
related work on community detection and attacks on complex
network. Sec. III presents our attack strategies for destroying
community structure in the network, including heuristics and
optimization methods. We demonstrate the experiments and
results in Sec. IV and finally draw conclusions in Sec. V.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Community Detection Algorithms
A large number of community detection algorithms have
been proposed since the problem brought up [14]. And detec-
tion algorithms continue to spring up because of the diversity
of networks in our real world. Here we mainly give a brief
introduction of some ones.
Girvan and Newman [23] first proposed a community
detection algorithm based on the betweenness of edges and
experiments showed that it did a good job in small networks.
Some researchers made changes on this study and proposed
new ones, e.g.,Tyler et al. [24] got approximate betweenness
using the fast algorithm of Brandes, Radicchi et al. [25] used
clustering coefficient of edges instead so that only local infor-
mation was required and the efficiency of the algorithm was
improved. Besides, Newman [26] also proposed a greedy algo-
rithm which mainly aimed at optimizing modularity. CNM was
an improvement of Newman’s method, which was proposed by
Clauset et al. [27]. The main technology used in this algorithm
was the data structures that called stacks. Futhermore, Blondel
et al. [28] divided the modularity optimization problem into
two levels and the computational complexity was essential
linearly. Spectral clustering algorithms [29], [30] leveraged
the eigenvalue spectrum of several graph matrices to detect
the community structure in networks.
Except these methods based on modularity optimization, re-
searchers also considered the problem of community detection
from other perspectives. Label Propagation Algorithm (LPA)
was proposed by Raghavan et al. [31], whose main idea was
updating the label of each node according to its neighbors.
Rosvall et al. [32] proposed an algorithm called Infomap,
which was based on information theory. This algorithm found
out the partition for the network through optimizing the
average length of description L(M). Further, Ronhovde and
Nussinov [33] proposed a community detection algorithm
based on the minimization of the Hamiltonian of Potts model.
B. Attacks on Complex Networks
Several earlier researches have studied the influence of
attacks on the network performance. Holme et al. [19] pro-
posed four strategies to investigate the attack vulnerability of
different kinds of networks, including ID removal, IB removal,
RD removal and RB removal, both for nodes and links. ID re-
moval represented removing nodes (or links) according to the
descending order of degrees in the initial network while “B”
represented betweenness and “R” represented recalculation. In
this study, it was validated that the network structure changed
and some performances degraded via attacks. Bellingeri et
al. [34] found that node deletion according to betweenness
centrality was most efficient while using the size of Largest
Connected Component (LCC) as a measure of network dam-
age. As for the community structure, Karrer et al. [35] studied
the robustness of community structure in networks through
perturbing networks in a specific way. They constructed a
random network with the same number of nodes and links
as the original one, then replaced the links in the original
network with that in the random one with the probability of
α. These studies shed lights on the further work about taking
attacks on networks.
Adversarial attacks against some network algorithms are
emerging in recent years. Yu et al. [36] developed both
heuristic and evolutionary methods to add subtle perturbations
to original networks, so that some sensitive links would be
harder to predict. Dai et al. [37] proposed three methods
to modify graph structure, including RL-S2V, GradArgmax
and GeneticAlg, aiming at fooling the classifiers based on
GNN models. Moreover, Zu¨gner et al. [38] proposed the first
adversarial attack on networks using GCN, namely NETTACK,
and found that this method was effective on node classification
task. Quite recently, Bojchevski and Gu¨nnemann [39], as well
as Chen et al. [40], proposed adversarial attacks on network
embedding at the same time, which may promote the extensive
discussion on the robustness of network algorithms, since net-
work embedding establishes a bridge between network space
and Euclidean space and thus facilitates many downstream
algorithms, such as node classification and link prediction.
C. Researches on Anti-Detection of Community
As for privacy concerns aroused by community detection,
some researchers started paying attention to this problem
during the last two years. Waniek et al. [17] came up with
two heuristic algorithms ROAM and DICE for hiding in-
dividuals and communities, respectively. DICE implemented
through disconnecting d intra-links of given community C
and connecting b−d inter-links under budget b and a measure
was proposed to evaluate the concealment. Finoda et al. [18]
proposed the concept of community deception to cope with
community detection. Safeness-based deception algorithm and
modularity-based deception algorithm were mainly tested
through amounts of experiments. Another job they did was
defining the deception score to evaluate effects of proposed
methods. Similar to the measure proposed in [17], deception
score also took community spread and hiding into account
and it was more comprehensive while reachability was also
3Fig. 1: The framework of community detection attack. We get the attack scheme Eattack combined with community detection
algorithms. Two metrics Q and NMI are used to evaluate the attack effect.
considered. Extensive distribution of members in C and less
percentages of C
′
s for each Ci ∈ C showed a good hiding,
where C was the community structure detected by specific
community detection algorithm and Ci was one element in C.
There is still little attention that has been paid on the
problem of taking attacks on the network to make it harder
for algorithms to detect the community structure. And both
Waniek’s and Finoda’s researches are dedicated to hide only a
small set of nodes (community C in the broad sense) targetly.
In this paper, we address the problem of information over-
mined in community detection from a global perspective. We
aim at making the overall quantification of the communities
detected in networks decrease significantly with subtle network
changes, which shows the effectiveness of our attack strategies.
III. METHODS
First, we briefly demonstrate the major problem we focus on
in this paper, using related notations and definitions. Let G =
(V,E) be the original network, where V = {v1, v2, ..., vn} is
the set of nodes and E = {e1, e2, ..., em} is the set of links.
Eattack = {+e˜1,−e˜2, ...,+e˜2T−1,−e˜2T } is the solution that
comprised of a series of links, “+” represents adding the link
to the network while “-” represents removing. Then, we have
the adversarial network G′ = (V ′, E′) defined as follows:{
V ′ = V
E′ = E + Eattack
(1)
We thus want to find out such Eattack to change some connec-
tions in G and get the adversarial network G′. And for these
G′s, community detection algorithms perform significantly
worse, i.e., the quality of detection results decreases.
Fig. 1 gives the overview of our work. In the following, we
give the details of attack strategies for community detection
algorithms proposed in this paper, including heuristics and
evolutionary ones.
A. Heuristic Attack Strategy
We have introduced that we take link attacks on the network
to change some relations between nodes. In this paper, we
choose rewiring attack to maintain the degree of target nodes,
i.e., adding a link to the target node while deleting one from
it. Such rewiring attack is of relatively less cost, i.e., only two
nodes need to change their degree under a rewiring attack,
while four nodes may change their degree if we choose to
remove a link between two nodes and add a link between
another two at the same time. In social networks, one rewiring
attack means getting a false friend while hiding a real one
for the person chosen as the target node, the total number of
friends of this person keeps unchanged, such attack way can
maintain the person’s status in the entire network, i.e., rewiring
shows a good concealment of taking attacks on the network.
While thinking of attack strategies, we first come up with
a Random Attack (RA) strategy, described in Algorithm 1,
for comparison. Here, we randomly select K nodes from G
to form a target node set Vt. We then randomly select a
node vi ∈ Vt in each iteration and implement the following
operation: deleting an existent link while adding nonexistent
one for the target node. The neighbor set of the target node
vi is denoted by Ni = {vj | < vi, vj >∈ E}, while its non-
neighbor set is denoted by N i. The number of rewiring
attacks (or the number of iterations), denoted by T , is another
parameter that represents the attack cost. The procedure of
random attack strategy is shown in following pseudo-code.
4Algorithm 1: Random Attack (RA)
Input: G,K,T
Output: G′
1 Vt ← RandomK(G,K);
2 AttackNum = 0;
3 for AttackNum < T do
4 vi ← RandomOne(Vt);
5 Ni, Ni ← GetSet(G, vi);
6 if Ni 6= ∅ and Ni 6= ∅ then
7 vdel ← RandomOne(Ni);
8 vadd ← RandomOne(Ni);
9 remove < vi, vdel > from E and add
< vi, vadd > to E;
10 Update G;
11 AttackNum = AttackNum+ 1;
12 end
13 end
14 Get the adversarial network G′ under T rewiring attacks.
Algorithm 2: Community Detection Attack (CDA)
Input: G, K, T
Output: G′
1 C = {C1, C2, ..., Ch} ← Detection(G);
2 Vt ← RandomK(G,K);
3 AttackNum = 0;
4 for AttackNum < T do
5 vi ← RandomOne(Vt);
6 S1, S2 ← GetSet(G, vi, C);
7 if S1 6= ∅ and S2 6= ∅ then
8 vdel ← RandomOne(S1);
9 vadd ← RandomOne(S2);
10 remove < vi, vdel > from E and add
< vi, vadd > to E;
11 Update G;
12 AttackNum = AttackNum+ 1;
13 end
14 end
15 Get the adversarial network G′ under T rewiring attacks.
A network with community structure often shows the char-
acteristic of having a high density of intra-community links
and a lower density of inter-community links. Deleting links
within community and adding links between communities
thus can weaken the community structure in the network.
Therefore, having some knowledge of the community structure
in advance can help to design more effective attack strategies.
Based on this, we propose a heuristic attack strategy combined
with the community division results via specific commu-
nity detection algorithm, called Community Detection Attack
(CDA), the procedure of which is shown in Algorithm 2.
For target node vi, we define its intra-community neighbor
set as S1 = Ci∩Ni, where Ci is the node set of the community
that vi belongs to. Similarly, we can get its inter-community
non-neighbor set S2 = Ci ∩N i, with Ci = V − Ci.
Fig. 2 illustrates how the CDA strategy works graphically.
Fig. 2: C1 and C2 represent the communities detected by a
specific community detection algorithm and different colors of
nodes represent different communities they belong to. Node
6 is chosen from the target node set Vt as the target node
under the current attack. S1 and S2 represent intra-community
neighbor set and inter-community non-neighbor set of the
target node, respectively. The line with a red “×” represents
the deleted link and the dashed line represents the added link,
performed by the attack.
Algorithm 3: Target Nodes Chosen Based on Degree
1 C = {C1, C2, ..., Ch} ← Detection(G);
2 for len(KNode) < K do
3 v ← BiggestDegree(V );
4 add node v to KNode;
5 V = V − Ci, where v ∈ Ci;
6 if K > h then
7 update V every turn;
8 repeat from step BiggestDegree;
9 end
10 end
For the target node, the removal of intra-community links
weakens its connection with the original organization and the
addition of inter-community links generates a force to drag it
to the others.
It was found that many real-world networks followed power-
law degree distribution [41], consistent with the classic 80/20
rule. That means, usually, a small number of nodes possess
a large number of connections, while the rest only have a
few in real-world networks. Some changes of these hub nodes
of larger degree usually have a bigger impact on the whole
network structure. For instance, statistically, people with more
friends in social networks always plays more important roles
in the circle and their absence seems to make the party less
active. Therefore, we propose another heuristic attack strategy,
namely Degree Based Attack (DBA), aiming to attack the
nodes of large degree in the network.
The only difference between DBA and CDA is that, in DBA
we choose the nodes of large degree as our target nodes, while
in CDA we do it randomly. Thus, next we just explain how
to choose the K target nodes in DBA based on node degree,
since the rest attack part is totally the same as CDA. The
5Fig. 3: The overview of one iteration of GA based Q-Attack Strategy.
procedure to choose the target nodes based on their degree
in DBA is shown in Algorithm 3. We get the community
detection results C = {C1, C2, ..., Ch} at the beginning of the
algorithm. The function BiggestDegree (line3) gets the node
with the biggest degree from node set V and the procedure
in line 5 means removing the nodes belonging to Ci from
V . One turn is finished when we have iterated through all
communities in C and gotten the node with the biggest degree
in each community. The step update V every turn (line 7)
means removing the nodes that have been chosen as targets
from the initial node set V , which consists of all the nodes in
the network.
B. GA Based Q-Attack
Evolutionary algorithms are a type of intelligent optimiza-
tion technologies designed by simulating natural phenomena
or leveraging various mechanisms of living organisms in
nature [42]–[44]. GA is a typical one of such algorithms. Its
basic model was firstly introduced and investigated by Holland
in 1975 [42], which mainly leveraged the natural selection
mechanism to solve optimization problems. A population
of chromosomes, which represent individuals with different
characteristics, initialize at the beginning of the algorithm
and then generate offspring according to the designed genetic
operators, such as crossover and mutation. Individuals with
better fitness have more chances to survive and multiply so
that the population are able to evolve. Here we propose an
attack strategy based on GA to search effective rewiring attack
schemes. Fig. 3 gives an overview of the evolutionary process.
Before the implementation of GA, we first give our encod-
ing method and fitness function.
• Encoding: Same as the attack strategies proposed in
Sec. III-A, here we choose a rewiring attack as a gene,
including a deleted link and an added link. The length of
each chromosome represents the number of attacks.
• Fitness function: Modularity is an important evaluation
to assess the quality of a particular partition for the
network and it has been widely applied in the field of
community detection (more details in Sec. IV-C). Here
we design our fitness function as follows:
f = e−Q, (2)
indicating that individuals of lower modularity will have
larger fitness. And this is also the reason why we name
this attack strategy as Q-Attack.
Now, we are going to find out individuals that can make the
partition of an adversarial network under specific community
detection algorithm have lower modularity. In the following,
we will give a specific illustration about how GA operates in
community detection attack.
• Initialization. An initial population is randomly gen-
erated at a fixed size in GA. One thing we need to
take care is to avoid link deletion or addition conflict,
which means deleting or adding a link repeatedly. Each
individual in the population is a combination of rewiring
attacks, representing a solution of attacks on the network.
• Selection. Selection is a manifestation of the survival of
the fittest mechanism. According to the laws of nature’s
evolution, the individuals of higher fitness have a greater
chance to survive and multiply than those of lower
fitness. We use a common selection operator, namely
roulette wheel. In this selection way, the probability for
an individual to mating is proportional to its fitness, as
represented by Eq. (3):
pi =
f(i)∑n
j=1 f(j)
. (3)
6Algorithm 4: Q-Attack Based on GA
Input: G,PopSize,Generation,Pc,Pm,T
Output: Pop
1 ParentPop← Inatialization(G,PopSize, T );
2 while i < Generation do
3 SelectedPop← Selection(ParentPop, PopSize);
4 CrossoverPop←
Crossover(SelectedPop, PopSize, T, Pc);
5 MutationPop←
Mutation(G,CrossoverPop, PopSize, T, Pm);
6 OffspringPop←
Elistism(MutationPop, ParentPop);
7 ParentPop← OffspringPop;
8 i← i+ 1;
9 end
• Crossover. Here, we adopt single point crossover which
is the easiest to achieve in GA, i.e., we generate a cut
point at random and change the gene segments between
parents. The probability for paired individuals to generate
offspring through crossover operation is denoted by Pc.
In order to avoid the conflicts on genes (as mentioned
before, two identical deleted-links or added-links are
not allowed to appear on one chromosome), we do a
feasibility test before two individuals get crossed.
• Mutation. To prevent the solution from falling into a lo-
cal optimum, mutation operator is a necessary component
in GA. Considering the network characteristics, here, we
propose three kinds of mutation operators: link-deletion
mutation, link-addition mutation and link-reconnection
mutation. link-deletion or link-addition mutation indicates
that the deleted or added link of the gene changes
independently, while link-reconnection mutation indicates
that a gene is completely replaced. These three mutations
occur with equal probability and the overall mutation rate
is denoted by Pm. Such designs on mutation operators
can promote the diversity of population. Conflicts detec-
tion is also considered while the genes are mutating.
• Elitism. Over the course of evolution, individuals with
high fitness in the parent may be destroyed. Elitism
strategy has been proposed to solve this problem. In this
paper, we replace the worst 10% of the offspring with
the best 10% of the parent to maintain excellent genes.
• Termination criteria. We set the evolutionary generation
as a constant and the algorithm stops when this condition
is fulfilled.
In summary, GA based Q-Attack mainly involves the encod-
ing, fitness function and the design of genetic operators. The
pseudo-code of this attack strategy is shown in Algorithm 4.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
A. Datasets
In order to evaluate the attack effect of our attack strategies,
we test them on four real-world datasets, including Zachary’s
karate club network [45], bottlenose dolphin network [46],
American college football network [23] and American political
books network [29], which are commonly used for community
detection with ground-truth partitions.
• Zachary’s karate club network: It is a dataset about
the relationship in a karate club recorded by Zachary.
The network consists of 34 nodes and 78 links, which
is ultimately divided into two groups out of the conflicts
between the instructor and the administrator.
• Bottlenose dolphin network: This network is created by
Lusseau, demonstrating the associations of the dolphins
living off Doubtful Sound, New Zealand. The network
consists of 62 nodes and 159 links. In reality, these
dolphins are divided into two groups.
• American college football network: This dataset is
about the college football matches in one season. There
are 115 nodes and 613 links in the network. The nodes
which represent the college football teams belong to 12
communities.
• American political books network: The network con-
sists of 105 nodes and 441 links. Each node in the net-
work represents a book published on political topics and
the link between two books shows that they are purchased
by the same consumer. These books are divided into three
categories according to their political stands.
B. Community Detection Algorithms
Here, we introduce six well-known community detection
algorithms that are attacked by our strategies proposed in
Sec. III. Note that these algorithms are mainly used for
detecting non-overlapping community structures.
• Fast Newman Algorithm (FN) [26]: It is a hierarchical
agglomerative algorithm. Each node is considered as a
community at the beginning and we merge communities
in pairs repeatedly with the aim of optimizing Q, until
all the nodes are merged into one community.
• Spectral Optimization Algorithm (SOA) [29], [30]:
Through analyzing the spectral properties of networks,
Newman gives a reformulation of modularity:
Q =
1
4m
sT (Aij − kikj
2m
)s =
1
4m
sTBs (4)
where m is the number of links, Aij is the element
of adjacency matrix A, s is a column vector with each
element si representing the community label of node vi,
ki and kj are the degrees of nodes vi and vj , respectively.
B is called modularity matrix. The communities that
nodes belong to depend on the signs of the elements in
the leading eigenvector of the modularity matrix.
• Louvain Algorithm (LOU) [28]: This algorithm consid-
ers the community detection as a multi-level modularity
optimization problem. It starts with isolated nodes and
repeats the process of removing the node to the commu-
nity which obtains maximum gain of modularity until no
further improvement can be achieved. Then it constructs
a new network by merging the community into a super-
node. These two steps are performed repeatedly until the
algorithm is stable.
• Label Propagation Algorithm (LPA) [31]: Each node
is assigned a label at the beginning of the algorithm and
7it is updated as the most frequent label of the node’s
neighbors during the information propagation process.
The algorithm terminates when no node changes its label
anymore.
• Infomap Algorithm (INF) [32]: This algorithm is based
on network maps and coding theory. It detects com-
munities by compressing the description of information
flows on networks. In other words, the key of Infomap
is to minimize the average description length L(M)
since more information is generated when random walks
between communities occur.
• Node2vec+KMeans (Node2vec+KM) [47]: Node2vec
is one of the state-of-the-art embedding methods and
it learns low-dimensional representation for nodes in
the network. K-means clustering algorithm is then used
to detect communities when nodes are embedded into
Euclidean space through node2vec.
C. Metrics for Community Structure
• Modularity: It is widely used to measure the quality
of divisions of a network, especially for the networks
with unknown community structure, which was firstly
proposed by Newman and Grivan [48] and is defined by
Q =
∑
i
(eii − a2i ), (5)
where eii represents the fraction of links in the network
with two terminals both in cluster Ci, ai =
∑
j eij
represents the fraction of links that connect to the nodes
in cluster Ci. In other words, modularity Q measures the
difference between actual fraction of within-community
links and the expected value of the same quantity with
random connections. A reformulation of the modularity
is represented by Eq. (4).
• Normalized Mutual Information (NMI): It is another
commonly used criterion to assess the quality of clus-
tering results in analyzing network community structure,
which was proposed by Danon et al. [49]. For two parti-
tions X and Y , the mutual information I(X,Y ) is defined
as the relative entropy between the joint distribution
P (XY ) and the production distribution P (X)P (Y ):
I(X,Y ) = D(P (X,Y )||P (X)P (Y ))
=
∑
x,y
p(x, y) log
p(x, y)
p(x)p(y)
. (6)
A noticeable problem for mutual information alone being
a similarity measure is that subpartitions derived from Y
by splitting some of its clusters into small ones would
have same mutual information with Y . NMI thus is
proposed to deal with this problem, which is defined by
Inorm(X,Y ) =
2I(X,Y )
H(X) +H(Y )
. (7)
The value of NMI indicates the similarity between two
partitions, i.e., the larger value means more similar be-
tween the two. When NMI equals 1, partition X is
identical to partition Y .
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Fig. 4: The curves of best fitness for various values of param-
eters Pc and Pm when Q-Attack is applied to FN algorithm
on Dolphins network.
Table I: Optimal parameters for Q-Attack in different cases
FN+Kar FN+Dol SOA+Kar SOA+Dol LOU+Kar LOU+Dol
Pc 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.8
Pm 0.1 0.06 0.1 0.04 0.1 0.1
D. Experimental Results
Our experiments are performed on a PC i5 CPU 2.60GHz
and 4GBs RAM. Our programming environment is python
2.7. We firstly test our attack strategies on three community
detection algorithms and two networks with different attack
number T. For our GA based Q-Attack strategy, it concludes
four parameters. We set the population size PopSize = 100
and the evolutionary generation Generation = 500 uniformly.
Then, we tune the crossover rate Pc and the mutation rate Pm
from four different values (0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8 for Pc and 0.04,
0.06, 0.08, 0.1 for Pm), respectively, according to the results
for parameter configuration. Fig. 4 shows the curves of best
fitness for a set of experiments when Q-Attack is applied to
FN algorithm on Dolphins, and we get the optimal parameters
Pc = 0.6 and Pm = 0.06 for this case, under T = 4, which
is a medium value. Table I gives all the optimal parameters
we use for Q-Attack in six different situations here. And for
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Fig. 5: The attack effects of the four attack strategies on three community detection algorithms and Karate network, for various
numbers of attacks.
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Fig. 6: The attack effects of the four attack strategies on three community detection algorithms and Dolphins network, for
various numbers of attacks.
heuristic attack strategies proposed in Sec. III-A, the numbers
of target nodes for Karate and Dolphins are set to 5 (15%
nodes) and 6 (10% nodes) respectively.
Modularity Q and NMI introduced in Sec. IV-C are taken
as the metrics to evaluate effectiveness of attack strategies.
The results are shown in Figs. 5 and 6. Corresponding to
each specified T , we generate 50 adversarial networks for each
heuristic strategy and record the mean values of Q and NMI.
Each point on the curve of Q-Attack is the mean value over
10 runnings with T changing from 2 to 8. While for T = 1,
crossover operator described in GA is hard to implement. Here
are two solutions for this problem: 1) we can perform an
internal crossover for one rewiring attack, i.e. swapping out the
deleted link or the added one; 2) we can get the best result by
9Table II: Attack results when the attack number is set to a fixed percentage of links in the networks. Here, we only present
the relative reduction of Q and NMI, compared with their values in the original network without attack.
Karate
Q NMI
FN SOA LOU LPA INF Node2vec+KM Average FN SOA LOU LPA INF Node2vec+KM Average
Original 0.381 0.371 0.419 0.380 0.402 0.368 0.387 0.692 1 0.587 0.806 0.699 0.951 0.789
RA 0.24% 5.62% 4.43% 18.13% 3.64% 6.47% 6.42% 19.14% 8.16% 3.79% 27.58% 9.43% 13.30% 13.57%
CDA 0.53% 8.64% 6.56% 23.89% 12.93% 9.78% 10.39% 24.23% 19.84% 8.14% 34.45% 23.76% 23.37% 22.30%
DBA 4.46% 13.24% 10.75% 26.48% 15.93% 14.53% 14.23% 8.71% 16.84% 2.65% 33.12% 7.33% 19.22% 14.65%
Q-Attack 23.64% 37.70% 26.92% 36.95% 74.28% 43.74% 40.54% 41.06% 53.81% 41.30% 35.54% 68.07% 63.92% 50.62%
Dolphins
Q NMI
FN SOA LOU LPA INF Node2vec+KM Average FN SOA LOU LPA INF Node2vec+KM Average
Original 0.495 0.390 0.519 0.506 0.524 0.379 0.469 0.573 0.753 0.511 0.607 0.553 0.889 0.648
RA 0.09% 3.81% 2.15% 9.83% 3.19% 3.23% 3.72% 12.52% 11.84% 11.71% 5.28% 13.47% 9.22% 10.67%
CDA 2.88% 5.10% 4.71% 17.74% 6.76% 4.20% 6.90% 18.14% 22.94% 11.45% 1.47% 16.53% 19.41% 14.99%
DBA 6.49% 12.51% 5.53% 18.26% 8.72% 11.52% 10.50% 15.98% 13.41% 9.48% 2.41% 15.80% 14.35% 11.91%
Q-Attack 26.04% 44.53% 24.38% 22.63% 12.84% 19.59% 25.00% 45.27% 62.83% 35.24% 6.66% 15.97% 39.93% 34.32%
Football
Q NMI
FN SOA LOU LPA INF Node2vec+KM Average FN SOA LOU LPA INF Node2vec+KM Average
Original 0.550 0.493 0.605 0.603 0.601 0.598 0.575 0.698 0.699 0.890 0.888 0.924 0.922 0.837
RA -0.05% -3.26% 1.89% 4.59% 1.94% 1.91% 1.17% -4.26% -5.38% 1.94% 1.08% 0.00% 0.05% -1.09%
CDA 1.86% -0.65% 2.97% 5.31% 3.16% 3.25% 2.65% -1.18% 1.63% 2.64% 1.60% 0.12% 0.24% 0.84%
DBA 0.56% -0.03% 3.16% 5.47% 3.22% 3.28% 2.61% 0.13% -1.49% 2.44% 1.49% 0.11% 0.39% 0.51%
Q-Attack 20.36% 19.97% 11.02% 9.12% 3.43% 4.59% 11.42% 27.10% 34.23% 16.01% 6.93% -0.20% 2.68% 14.46%
Polbooks
Q NMI
FN SOA LOU LPA INF Node2vec+KM Average FN SOA LOU LPA INF Node2vec+KM Average
Original 0.502 0.467 0.520 0.495 0.523 0.500 0.501 0.531 0.520 0.512 0.586 0.493 0.564 0.534
RA 1.26% 1.66% 1.76% 2.01% 1.59% 1.62% 1.65% 0.11% 0.71% 1.60% 4.74% 0.10% 1.41% 1.45%
CDA 2.95% 3.96% 2.75% 3.89% 2.64% 3.05% 3.21% 2.89% 1.01% 3.50% 7.94% 1.07% 5.00% 3.57%
DBA 3.80% 2.44% 3.02% 5.30% 3.29% 3.31% 3.53% 0.72% 2.50% -1.17% 9.10% -1.50% 2.20% 1.98%
Q-Attack 22.17% 16.35% 17.92% 5.40% 7.48% 5.82% 12.52% 40.53% 21.29% 37.06% 13.02% 0.56% 7.97% 20.07%
going through all possible situations. Here, we get the results
according to the second solution, since the two networks here
we use are both small and thus it only takes little time to get
the results.
From Figs. 5 and 6, we can see that, in general, for almost
all attack strategies, the values of Q and NMI decrease as the
budget T increases, i.e., the attack effect is more significant
when more links can be changed. As expected, Q-Attack
behaves best to reduce the value of Q. This is not surprising
since its goal is designed to minimize Q, based on Eq. (2).
Moreover, for the other metric NMI, we can still find that the
curves for Q-Attack present sharper decline than the others,
indicating its best attack effect on both Karate and Dolphins
networks. Such results validate that our GA based Q-Attack
is indeed more effective in both weakening the strength of
community structure and reducing the similarity between the
community detection results and the true labels. Besides, we
also notice that, in most situations, DBA does a better job than
CDA in reducing Q while we get the opposite results on the
metric NMI. This seems reasonable by considering that nodes
of large degree plays a vital role in maintaining the structure
of network and thus attacks on such nodes may affect the
network structure more significantly. However, on the other
hand, such large-degree nodes always stay in the centers of
communities, and thus are relatively difficult to be grouped
into wrong communities when they are under attack, which
may lead to the less reduction of NMI for DBA than CDA.
To provide more comprehensive and quantitative compar-
isons, we take extensive experiments on six community de-
tection algorithms and four networks totally. Crossover rate
Pc and mutation rate Pm are set to 0.8 and 0.1, respectively.
The parameter K, i.e. the number of nodes chosen as targets in
heuristic attack strategies, is set to 11 (10% nodes) for Football
and 10 (10% nodes) for Polbooks. The attack number T is set
to 5% of total number of links in the network for Karate and
Dolphins, 2% for larger networks Football and Polbooks. We
use the default settings for the parameters in node2vec and
take the number of clusters in K-means the same as ground
truth. Table II shows the relative reductions of Q and NMI
under four attack strategies. For each column in the table, we
mark the top two best results as bold. Again, we see that
our GA based Q-Attack has significantly better attack effects,
in terms of larger relative reductions of both Q and NMI,
than the three heuristic strategies in almost all cases except
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Fig. 7: (a) Communities detected by Louvin algorithm on Karate network.(b) Communities detected by Louvin algorithm on
the adversarial network. Different colors of nodes represent the different communities they belong to, while different shapes
represent the different communities these nodes belong to according to the given label.
the reduction of NMI for Football while attacking on Infomap
algorithm. We also observe that the advantage of GA based Q-
Attack seems more obvious when we control the attack budget
to a smaller value. The relative reduction of two metrics for
Q-Attack is about 2 to 3 times those for the optimal heuristic
attack strategy on average with attack number T limited to 5%
for Karate and Dolphins while it increases to 5 times and even
more when attack number T is limited to 2% for Football and
Polbooks.
In Fig.7, we visualize an example that Q-Attack is applied
on the Louvin algorithm and Karate network. The community
structure in the original network detected by Louvin algorithm
is shown in Fig. 7 (a). The modularity Q and NMI are 0.4188
and 0.5866, respectively. We also use Louvin algorithm to
detect the community structure in the adversarial network
obtained under 4 rewiring attacks, which is shown in Fig. 7
(b). After attack, the modularity Q falls to 0.3053 while NMI
falls to 0.3078 and the number of communities changes from
4 to 5. We can see that, indeed, the community detection result
presents higher-level disorder after attack, indicating the good
attack effect of Q-Attack.
E. Transferability of Q-Attack
As we can see, Q-Attack is typically based on the mod-
ularity Q which depends on certain community detection
algorithm. However, there are a large number of community
detection algorithms in reality, it’s hard for us know which one
has been applied. Q-Attack may be of less practicability if the
adversarial network obtained according to a given community
detection algorithm loses its effectiveness on attacking others.
In order to address this concern, we design experiments to
testify the transferability of Q-Attack. The relative reductions
of modularity Q are presented in Table III. Again, for each
case, we mark the top two best results as bold.
We find that the adversarial networks obtained by Q-
Attack on specific community detection algorithms still show
considerable attack effects for others in most cases. Another
interesting finding is that adversarial networks obtained by
taking attacks on Louvain and Infomap show significant
transfer attack effects more frequently, while generalized to
other algorithms. Meanwhile, Louvain and Infomap seem
more robust since reductions of Q on these two algorithms
are relatively small in most cases, except taking attacks on
these two algorithms directly. The possible explanation for
our finding is that adversarial networks obtained by taking
attacks on algorithms with better performance will show a
stronger transferability. It is consistent with the findings in
the researches guided by Lancichinetti et al. [6] and Yang et
al. [50], which show Infomap and Louvain have better perfor-
mance through comparative analysis of different community
detection algorithms.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose several strategies, including CDA,
DBA and GA based Q-Attack, to attack a number of com-
munity detection algorithms for networks. We perform the
experiments on four well-known social networks, and find that
these attack strategies are effective to make the community
detection algorithms fail partly in most cases, in terms of
decreasing modularity Q and NMI, by just disturbing a small
number of connections. By comparison, Q-Attack behaves
much better than CDA and DBA in almost all the considered
white-box cases, where the target community detection algo-
rithms are known in advance. Moreover, this attack strategy
also presents certain transferability to make effective black-
box attacks. That is, the adversarial networks, generated by
Q-Attack on particular community detection algorithms, can
still be used to effectively attack many others. These results
indicate that it is feasible to utilize Q-Attack to protect people’s
privacy against community detection in reality.
With more and more attentions are focused on the problem
of information over-mined in social networks, many works
are left to be studied. For instance, here our Q-Attack method
only takes modularity Q as the optimization objective due to
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Table III: Analysis on the transferability of Q-Attack. Here, we use the adversarial networks, generated by Q-Attack on
particular community detection algorithms, to attack other algorithms.
Dataset Network FN SOA LOU LPA INF Node2vec+KM Average Average(-self)
Karate
Q-Attack(FN) 23.64% 13.84% 10.29% 36.91% 20.88% 18.33% 20.65% 20.05%
Q-Attack(SOA) 1.00% 37.70% 4.52% 27.98% 14.49% 25.00% 18.45% 14.60%
Q-Attack(LOU) 10.29% 12.72% 26.92% 31.57% 34.67% 15.14% 21.89% 20.88%
Q-Attack(LPA) 1.19% 9.52% 7.59% 36.95% 6.11% 12.76% 12.35% 7.43%
Q-Attack(INF) 10.78% 13.65% 15.23% 43.69% 74.28% 13.68% 28.55% 19.41%
Q-Attack(Node2vec+KM) 0.35% 13.27% 6.04% 40.50% 11.14% 43.74% 19.17% 14.26%
Dolphins
Q-Attack(FN) 26.04% 10.55% 7.32% 25.17% 7.48% 9.48% 14.34% 12.00%
Q-Attack(SOA) 3.92% 44.43% 5.12% 14.54% 6.25% 24.35% 16.43% 10.83%
Q-Attack(LOU) 8.08% 10.85% 24.96% 19.82% 10.24% 9.89% 13.97% 11.78%
Q-Attack(LPA) 5.61% 7.73% 7.06% 22.63% 9.15% 7.27% 9.91% 7.36%
Q-Attack(INF) 9.01% 9.83% 9.42% 22.63% 12.84% 9.50% 12.20% 12.08%
Q-Attack(Node2vec+KM) -0.49% 11.45% 1.53% 21.90% 3.12% 19.59% 9.52% 7.50%
Football
Q-Attack(FN) 20.36% -1.78% 2.85% 5.58% 2.87% 3.19% 5.51% 2.54%
Q-Attack(SOA) 0.44% 19.97% 2.81% 5.83% 2.59% 3.06% 5.78% 2.95%
Q-Attack(LOU) 3.13% -0.34% 11.02% 4.54% 3.08% 3.38% 4.14% 2.76%
Q-Attack(LPA) 0.62% -9.52% 2.48% 9.12% 2.75% 3.27% 1.45% -0.08%
Q-Attack(INF) 1.69% -9.65% 2.70% 3.99% 3.43% 4.10% 1.04% 0.57%
Q-Attack(Node2vec+KM) -0.69% -5.69% 2.32% 5.25% 2.35% 4.59% 1.35% 0.71%
Polbooks
Q-Attack(FN) 22.17% 2.92% 2.28% 4.48% 2.76% 3.13% 6.29% 3.11%
Q-Attack(SOA) 4.41% 16.35% 2.46% 3.74% 2.26% 2.70% 5.32% 3.11%
Q-Attack(LOU) 3.49% 4.20% 17.92% 5.58% 3.13% 2.90% 6.20% 3.86%
Q-Attack(LPA) 8.98% 3.79% 1.12% 5.40% 2.38% 3.05% 4.12% 3.86%
Q-Attack(INF) 2.45% 6.51% 5.10% 4.67% 7.48% 2.53% 4.79% 4.25%
Q-Attack(Node2vec+KM) 1.62% 2.44% 2.29% 4.38% 2.42% 5.82% 3.16% 2.63%
its simplicity, methods based on multi-objective optimization
are also worth studying and may present better attack effects.
And for wide applications on lager networks, designing at-
tack strategies of higher efficiency by simplifying the fitness
calculation and choosing the optimization algorithms with
lower time complexity is one of the research emphases in the
future. Besides, the community detection algorithms we have
considered in the experiments are mainly used to detect non-
overlapping communities, but there are also many overlapping
communities in the real world, the attack strategies thus can
be extended to such more general situations.
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